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Abstract 
 
Securitisation is an important financing technique. Following the financial crisis, reform 
activities in relation to pitfalls of securitisation have been underway. Particularly, a 
significant debate globally raged following the financial crisis about whether risk retention 
mechanisms before the crisis were effective. The idea is to align the incentives of 
originators/securitisers and investors in order to prevent the negative impact caused by the 
originate-to-distribute model. If the effective risk retention and due diligence goals are 
achieved, securitisation may continue to serve its benefits to investors and the full 
implementation of the reforms in the EU and the USA will act as deterrent and inject 
confidence in the markets.  
 
Keywords: securitisation, risk retention, incentives, IOSCO, Credit Requirements Directive 
article 122a, SEC Act s.15G. 
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SECURITISATION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE 
RISK RETENTION 
Orkun Akseli  
 
“...greed, for lack of a better word, is good.” 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Securitisation is a product of market needs and commercial practice. It is an innovative 
financing technique which ‘efficiently allocates risk with capital [and] enables companies to 
access to capital markets directly’.1 By disintermediation, where banks as intermediaries of 
funds are removed from the financing cycle,2 securitisation converts loans or assets that are 
not normally tradable (such as consumer receivables) into tradable securities which has the 
ability to raise finance faster than deposits can.3 Thus the risk inherent in assets that are on 
loan is efficiently channelled to the financial markets. However, due to its complex and 
technical nature,4 securitisation lacks transparency and so often its private law processes that 
shift the credit risk from originators to investors are misunderstood by the public. The 
                                                 

 Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law, Durham University. I would like to thank Mathias Siems and the 
participants of staff seminar at Durham University Law School for invaluable comments on an earlier draft. 
Usual disclaimers apply.  
 
The fictional character Gordon Gekko’s famous quote in the movie ‘Wall Street’ 1987. 
1
 S. Schwarcz, “The Future of Securitization” Duke Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 
223, November 2008, at 1. 
2
 S. Schwarcz, (2009) ‘Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net’ Duke Public Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series No. 235, at 2. 
3
 See generally F. J. Fabozzi, and V. Kothari, “Securitization: The Tool of Financial Transformation” Yale ICF 
Working Paper No. 07-07.  
4
 For the complex nature of the technique see e.g.  J.C. Hull, Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets, 
(Pearson, Boston, 7
th
 ed., 2010), 189-202; H. Davies, The Financial Crisis Who is to Blame?, 138 et seq. (Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 2010). Long before the financial crisis Professor Roy Goode raised the particular issue of 
complexity of securitisation and other derivatives transactions and the danger of sliding into illegal areas in 
financial transactions noting succinctly that ‘[t]he increasingly abstract nature of markets, in which a variety of 
complex derivatives can be traded separately from the underlying physical transactions, raises in acute form the 
question how to distinguish trading and hedging from gambling and speculation.’ R. Goode, Commercial Law in 
the Next Millennium, at 7 (Sweet and Maxwell, 1997). 
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complex nature of securitisation and other structured finance transactions need to be 
understood along with the fact that that their failure may lead to the Risk Originator’s failure.5 
These technicalities have been coupled with risky business and lending decisions which leave 
narrow or no margin for errors in terms of financial crisis. Although, generally speaking, 
there seems to be a reckless attribution of liability that securitisation as a financing technique 
had played a significant role leading to the financial crisis,6 the IMF Global Financial 
Stability Report7 clearly established that  
 
‘securitization ...was not the problem-it was a combination of lax underwriting 
standards in the U.S. mortgage market, the concomitant extension of securitisation 
into increasingly complex and difficult to understand structures, collateralized by 
increasingly lower quality assets and a favourable financial environment in which 
risks were insufficiently appreciated.’8 
 
Regulation of securitisation and other unregulated financial market products has become 
the pivotal point of discussion during the financial crisis. As securitisation is a product of 
financial markets and commercial practice there seems to be no clear statute or regulation that 
governs the interests, incentives and contractual positions of parties. Party autonomy seems to 
govern the market participants’ financial interests.9 This has been further encouraged by the 
deregulation of financial markets. Issues such as transparency (or the adequacy of 
transparency), investor sophistication and agency costs (whether the incentives of originators 
                                                 
5
 S. Schwarcz, “The Public Responsibility of Structured Finance Lawyers” (2006) 1 Capital Markets Law 
Journal 6, 6  
6
 See e.g. “The Main point about black swans and credit crises” Financial Times Letters, 17 May 2008 “… As 
George Soros put it: ‘Securitisation had the effect of transferring risk from people who are supposed to know 
risk and know the borrowers to people who don’t.’”; “Life could yet follow death for the idea of Securitization” 
Financial Times Comments, 03 October 2007. 
7
 IMF Global Financial Stability Report Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness (April 
2008) (“IMF Report 2008”). 
8
 Id., at xiii-xiv 
9
 For a similar view see Goode, supra note 4, at 11 arguing that  
[t]he derivatives market has given rise to a wondrous array of contractual and securitisation devices 
which enable market participants to package financial assets, loans and investments in whatever way 
best suits their needs to secure such benefits as hedging, arbitrage, reduction of balance sheet assets and 
the minimisation of tax liabilities. 
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and investors are misaligned and whether originators should retain risk) are significant in the 
role that securitisation played during the period leading to financial crisis. However, the 
particular issue that poses as a pressure point among these, arguably, is whether and how the 
originators (or securitisers) should retain risk in the securitised receivables. It is believed that 
a substantive carve out based on the type of securitisation, assets and securities is helpful in 
aligning, at least to a certain degree, the interests of investors and originators. A number of 
reform activities have taken place globally and regionally to address the particular issue of 
risk retention by originators with the intention to align the interests of investors and 
originators and to make it difficult for originators to remove these securitised assets from 
their balance sheets. It is argued that these limitations on reckless practices securitisation will 
lead to more responsibility taking in underwriting, rating and due diligence.   
 
In this article issues related to securitisation that led to loss of investor confidence in the 
financing technique will be subjected to greater scrutiny. The overarching theme of the article 
is that securitisation is important and that there is a need for stricter and meaningful 
regulation, particularly, in risk retention by originators for the purposes of aligning incentives 
with investors. Part 2 examines securitisation’s pitfalls and impact on the financial crisis. Part 
3 considers the need to have effective risk retention mechanisms. In this perspective, it looks 
at risk retention requirements in securitisation as designated under International Organisation 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Recommendations, EU Capital Requirement Directive 
and the proposed reforms in the US (entering into force in April 2013). Looking ahead, it 
suggests that the reform activities in relation to originator’s risk retention to align the 
incentives are, generally speaking, very detailed and take into account of some options in 
different types of securitisation scenarios. However, it is argued that the more significant 
amounts of risk is retained, more confidence will be established in the securitisation market. 
Conclusions will be in part 4.  
 
2. Securitisation: An innocent financing technique? 
  
Securitisation has been developed as an alternative method to raise finance to overcome 
the undercapitalisation risk of banks10 which may expose banks to distress. Securitisation has 
                                                 
10
 See T. Congdon, The Debt Threat The Dangers of High Real Interest Rates for the World Economy, 198 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1988). 
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the ability, firstly, to increase bank liquidity by reducing bank’s undercapitalisation risks and 
secondly, to spread their credit risk to financial markets to reduce their legal regulatory 
capital requirements.11 In the US, from 1930s to 1970s as a result of Glass-Steagall Act 
commercial banks were tightly regulated and prohibited from speculating on their depositors’ 
savings.12 This Act effectively separated commercial banking from investment banking and 
established Federal Deposit Insurance Cooperation (FDIC).13 Around the world, loans have 
been traditionally extended through deposits which are guaranteed by governments.14 
Particularly, in the late 1960s with the increased demand for mortgages, banks in the United 
States developed a model that enabled them to raise finance faster (without the need to limit 
their funding to deposits) and more balanced than other methods of raising finance according 
to which banks were pooling portfolios of mortgages the cash flows of which were then 
securitised and sold on to investors.15 The significance in this type of raising finance is the 
United States Government’s ‘full faith and credit’ through the Government National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA), in the sense that GNMA guarantees investors the payment 
of principal and interest on mortgages based securities that are insured by qualifying 
government departments.16 1970s and 1980s have seen increased public debt and rise of 
interest rates which led to the loss of investor and creditor confidence in the market. The 
complications caused by the increased dollar interest rates have had impact on sovereign 
                                                 
11
 See generally Y. Altunbas, L. Gambacorta, D. Marques, ‘Securitisation and the Bank Lending Channel’ 
European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 838, at 5 (December 2007); see also A. Kokkinis, 
‘Rethinking Banking Prudential Regulation: Why Corporate Governance Rules Matter’, Journal of Business 
Law 611, 622 [2012] noting that ‘[e]xtensive use of securitisation, …, was widely used before the recent 
financial crisis to circumvent capital adequacy ratios by removing assets from banks’ balance sheets.’ 
12
 Banking Act of 1933 H.R. 5661. The preamble of the Act states: “An Act to provide for the safer and more 
effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the undue diversion of funds into 
speculative operations, and for other purposes.”  
13
 FDIC provides insurance on deposits and effectively protects depositors against bank runs.   
14
 For a list and comparability of Deposit insurance/protection schemes see www.hmrc.gov.uk/drafts/schemes-
comp-fscs.pdf (accessed 5.02.2012) 
15
 See generally Hull, supra note 4, at 189 et seq. 
16
 http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/about.asp?Section=About (accessed on 23.11. 2011). These include Federal 
Housing Association and Department of Veteran Affairs. Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) 
established in 1938 and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) established in 1968 
(chartered by Congress in 1970) are other two government sponsored enterprises that securitize or buy mortgage 
loans originated by lenders. This provides liquidity to lenders so that they can lend more to their borrowers. 
http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/index.html and http://www.freddiemac.com/ (accessed 5.01.2012). 
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borrowers particularly in some of the developing Latin American countries where borrowers 
were mainly commodity producers.17 This led to different securitisation techniques where 
securities were created backed by assets without the guarantee provided in mortgage backed 
securities. However, assets in the asset backed securitisations are different than the collaterals 
in mortgage based securitisations (i.e. immovables). The value of the latter may be volatile 
depending on the financial markets, political and economic climate. Thus there seems to be 
more certainty in asset backed securitisations than there is in mortgage backed securitisations. 
The ratings of mortgage backed securitisations have been based and rated on the similar 
formulas used in asset backed securitisations, hence the triple-A rating of majority of 
mortgage backed securities from subprime borrowers. Furthermore, the subprime loans which 
were converted into securitised bonds and incorporated with other asset backed bonds and 
were sold to investors who were not necessarily sophisticated enough to realise the risks 
passing through the financial markets.
18
 
 
2.1 Securitisation’s role in the Financial Crisis  
 
The financial crisis takes its roots in the American subprime mortgage crisis. It has proved 
to have links to a number of interrelated financial, sociological and legal trends.19 These 
trends can be summarised as the growth of wealth and its utilisation in investments whether 
or not in an effective way; the financial sector and individuals’ ability to take risk; and 
deficiencies in the corporate governance and financial supervision.20 Economists have 
explained growth and utilisation of wealth from left-wing21 and conservative perspectives.22 
                                                 
17
 See Congdon, supra note 10, at 195-198. 
18
 See generally O. Bar-Gill, “The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts” 94 
Cornell L. Rev. 1073, 1082 et seq. (2009). 
19
 For a perspective of the roots of the Financial Crisis and measures to limit its damage see e.g. F. S. Mishkin, 
‘Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis’ 25 J. Economic Perspectives 49 (2011). 
20
 T. Cowen, ‘Three Trends and a Train Wreck’ N.Y. Times, 17 October 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/business/19view.html (accessed 10.11.2011). For the causes of credit 
boom see also A. Wilmarth, ‘The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of 
the Subprime Financial Crisis’ 41 Conn. L. Rev. 963, 1005 et seq. (2009) noting four factors for credit boom as 
Federal Reserve Board’s monetary policies, role played by financial conglomerates, currency exchange rate 
policies of Asian and oil exporting countries and mass psychology and belief on the potential continuity of 
credit boom and prices. 
21
 see e.g. ‘Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on 
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According to the former view while globalisation23 was introduced to reduce the wealth 
inequality by stabilising financial markets and providing equal opportunities for both 
developed and developing economies in access to credit, it failed in this mission and caused 
domino effect in the collapse of economies and financial institutions.24 Securitisation and 
other innovative financing techniques have been employed to counterbalance the economic 
problems affecting consumers and businesses.25 Counter arguments challenged the income 
and wealth inequality and the effects of globalisation on the crisis.26 There are also views 
about the role of securitisation in the financial crisis. One group of commentators argued that 
securitisation did not weaken underwriting standards as lending and borrowing decisions 
were based on FICO scores,27 while the others suggested that it was the declining house 
prices that caused the sub-prime crisis and that the originators were retaining risk in the 
securitisation food chain.28 The opposing view suggested that securitisation degraded 
traditional underwriting standards by allowing originate-to-distribute model and reducing the 
dynamic underwriting standards and replacing them with the statistical analysis and the 
ability to screen the loans, thereby creating a less transparent market. This, in turn, led banks 
                                                                                                                                                        
Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System’, available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/financial_commission.shtml (accessed 10.11.2011). 
22
 See e.g. http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070206a.htm (accessed 10.11.2011); J. 
Parker and A. Vissing-Jorgensen, ‘Who bears aggregate Fluctuations and How?’ NBER Working Paper no. 
14665 (2009). 
23
 J. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, 9 (Penguin Books, London, 2002).    
24
 Supra note 21, 14. 
25
 Supra note 21, 26 where the report states that  
‘[t]he negative impact of stagnant real incomes and rising income inequality on aggregate demand was 
largely offset by financial innovation in risk management and lax monetary policy that increased the 
ability of households to finance consumption by borrowing, especially in the United States and in some 
other developed countries such as the United Kingdom. …social protection systems that provided 
partial compensation for stagnating income in a context of high unemployment were financed through 
increased public deficits and public debts.’ 
26
 See generally Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 22. 
27
 E.g. G. Bhardwaj and R. Sengupta, ‘Where’s the Smoking Gun? A Study of underwriting standards for US 
Subprime Mortgages’ (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper Series No. 2008-036A, 2008). Sub-
prime borrowers are those who FICO (Fair Isaac Corporation) scores are below 620. See 
http://www.fico.com/en/Products/Scoring/Pages/FICO-Score.aspx (accessed 12.12.2011). 
28
 E.g. G. Gorton, ‘The Panic of 2007’ Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2008, available at 
http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2008/Gorton.08.04.08.pdf (accessed 11.02.2012). A  
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to increase their leverage levels and thus thinly capitalised acting as the causal element in the 
financial crisis.29  
 
In the early 2000s the US Federal Reserve reduced the interest rates to facilitate economic 
growth. Favourable economic conditions during that period, such as low interest rates and 
lending availability to sub-prime borrowers, led both borrowers and lenders to take more 
risky financial decisions. This, in turn, led banks to increase their securitisation and originate-
to-distribute models which shifted the risk to investors (rather than requiring banks to hold 
their loans until maturity and concentrate the credit risk in the balance sheets) without the 
adequate transparency, risk retention or explanation of legal processes.30 Arguably the 
rationale for lending subprime borrowers in the pre-crisis period was the appreciation of 
property prices which allowed more appetite to sell houses and the increased role of private 
sector in the securitisation process which demonstrated a shift from governmental agencies 
like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to investment banks during which the latter in exchange for 
higher yields securitised subprime mortgages.31 This seems to be the root of misaligned 
incentives (originators are only interested in pooling the receivables and distributing them 
without retaining risks). Similar arguments equally apply in the UK market, where with the 
widespread use of securitisation and other unregulated financing techniques, low cost credit 
has been made available.32 The G20 Declaration on the Summit of Financial Markets and the 
World Economy succinctly further identified the causes of the financial crisis as follows:  
                                                 
29 E.g. K. Eggert, ‘The Great Collapse: How Securitization caused the Subprime Meltdown?’41 Conn. L. Rev. 
1257 (2009); K. Eggert, ‘Beyond "Skin in the Game": The Structural Flaws in Private-Label Mortgage 
Securitization That Caused the Mortgage Meltdown’, Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (23 September 2010); see also L. Cox, B. Dorudi et al., ‘United KingdomRegulatory Reform: 
Emergence of the Twin Peaks’ Compliance Officer Bulletin 1, 4-5 (2012). See also R. Tomasic and F. 
Akinbami, ‘Towards a new corporate governance after the global financial crisis’ ICCLR 237, 239-240 (2011). 
30
 See e.g. Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, 1 (7 April 
2008); see also A. Aurora, ‘The Global Financial Crisis: A New Global Regulatory Order’ Journal of Business 
Law 670, 672 [2010]. 
31
 B. Keys, T. Mukherjee, A. Seru and V. Vig, ‘Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from 
Subprime Loans’ in R. Kolb (ed.) Lessons from the Financial Crisis Causes, Consequences and our Economic 
Future, 217, 218 (John Wiley & Sons, 2010). For a summary of the system see e.g. A. Paolini, ‘Lending Sub-
prime and advising on financial investments from a D & O Perspective’ Journal of Business Law 432, 433-4 
[2012]. 
32
 The Turner Review A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (March 2009), 13-16 and 29-32 
available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf (accessed 20.01.2012) 
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‘During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged 
stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields without an 
adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. …weak 
underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex 
and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to create 
vulnerabilities in the system.’33 
 
During the pre-crisis period originators have excessively exposed themselves to 
securitisation practices which allowed them ‘to off-load part of their credit exposure, thereby 
lowering regulatory pressures on capital requirements and raising new funds.’34 Banks were 
transferring their loans from borrowers to special purpose vehicles and then to financial 
market investors under the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model. Thus banks that were excessively 
relying on securitisation had, seemingly, better capital structures.35 This is achieved by way of 
transferring their credit risk to special purpose vehicles and then onto investors rather than 
being kept on the balance sheet until the borrowers’ repayment. That means that 
securitisation ‘removes the loans from the banks’ balance sheets and enables the banks to 
expand their lending faster than they would otherwise be able to.’36 Subprime borrowers may 
not have sophisticated financial information which exposes them to predatory lending.37 It is 
this feature of securitisation arguably misled investors as well as borrowers. Rising house 
prices was the fundamental reason why banks lent to people with poor credit histories with 
the expectation that even if they defaulted in their payments it would be possible to sell these 
houses without banks having any actual losses. In other words, the idea was to sell and 
recover any monies before the maturity of these securities arising out of subprime mortgage 
                                                 
33
 See G20 Declaration on the Summit of Financial Markets and the World Economy, available at 
http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/washington.pdf (accessed 7.11.2011), at 1. For similar points see 
also Eggert, supra note 29. 
34
 See Y. Altunbas, S. Mangnelli and D. Marques-Ibanez, ‘Bank Risk During the Financial Crisis Do Business 
Models Matter?’ European Central Bank Working Paper Series No 1394 November 2011, 15; for a similar view 
see A. Van Rixtel and S. Craido, ‘The Contribution of Structured Finance to the Financial Crisis’ 239, 244, in 
Kold (ed.), supra note 31.  
35
 See id., Altunbas et al., 15. 
36
 Hull, supra note 4, 201. 
37
 For contractual design features of subprime mortgage contracts and the effects of this on unsophisticated 
borrowers see Bar-Gill, supra note 18, 1096 et seq.  
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securitisations. Arguably these were high-risk loans because there was no guarantee whether 
subprime borrowers could be able to repay. These loans were gathered and sold to investment 
firms and SPVs. Rating agencies rather traditionally have given high ratings to mortgage 
backed securities because the default rate on those rates were traditionally lower than the 
asset backed securities. The underwriting standards in those types of assets were different 
than the normal securitisation practices. Despite the fact that securities were backed by 
subprime mortgages, they were continuously highly rated and the lack of liquidity in those 
highly rated securities due to defaults on the mortgage payments led to the collapse of 
securitisation market.38  
 
It is also argued that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 193339 provisions by the 
Gramm-Leach-Blilley Act of 1999 thus the removal of the strict separation between 
investment and commercial banks has a clear significance in this process.
40
 Glass-Steagall 
Act had prohibited the commercial banks to utilise their depositors’ money to speculate in 
risky financial market transactions. Their main duty was to take deposits and lend to 
borrowers and thus, act as a financial intermediary. Arguably, merging the operations of 
investment and commercial banks, led to the undercapitalisation of banks as they had built up 
excessive leverage (i.e. they had more borrowed money from the markets in their balance 
sheets than their own money or deposits).41 Furthermore, banks also relaxed their lending 
standards which led to the possibility of lending to uncreditworthy borrowers. Irresponsible 
                                                 
38
 See generally J.J. De Vries Robbé, ‘Securitization Law and Practice In the face of the Credit Crunch’ 7-8 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2008); see also A. Sloan, ‘House of Junk a close-up one deal shows how 
subprime mortgages went bad’ October 29, 2007 Fortune 117-124. 
39
 The Act also prohibited floating interest rates thus effectively capping the interest rates (Regulation Q). This 
was repealed early in the 1980s. For the implications of repealing Glass-Steagall Act and background and 
criticism of these legislative activities see e.g. J. Stiglitz, ‘Capitalist Fools’ Vanity Fair, January 2009 
40
 For further information see e.g. F. Yeager, N. Seitz, et al., ‘US Legislation designed to improve corporate 
governance: An Exploration’ Company Lawyer 25, 30-31 (2012); N. Seitz, J. Gilsinan, et al., ‘The US Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis: What have we learned?’ Company Lawyer 355, 358 et seq. (2011). 
41
 See e.g. Altunbas, Mangnelli and Marques-Ibanez, supra note 34, 34 where they state that  
‘…the distress experienced during the financial crisis was driven by ex-ante bank size, 
undercapitalisation, and the degree of credit expansion in the years preceding it. The bank funding 
structure seems to be of significance, with those banks relying on large deposit base suffering less than 
those more dependent on market funding.’ 
As part of a regulatory approach to systemic risk reducing leverage can have the potential. For further 
information see S. Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’ 97 Georgetown L. J. 193, 223 et seq (2008). 
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lending and further leveraging increased the risk levels of banks, because they have 
misaligned their incentives with investors. The liquidity squeeze became the significant 
problem for banks during the period leading up to financial crisis.42 The trend of reckless risk 
taking continued by the deregulation of financial products which began by the enactment of 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act 2000 which declared regulation attempts of futures 
and derivatives as illegal (s.103), thus allowing risk increasing self-regulation.
43
 With this 
amendment the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has been, somewhat, excluded 
from any regulatory attempts it may have over the credit default swaps44 as the amendment 
allowed eligible parties to slip outside the net of Commodities Exchange Act (CEA). 
However, ironically, this was presented as ‘Legal Certainty’.45 The significance of this point 
                                                 
42
 See Davies, supra note 4, 50-53. It was argued that the liquidity squeeze was a result of neglect of liquidity 
regulation because central banks would help banks if there was need for liquidity and thus, in fact, putting the 
risk onto central banks.  
43
 On self-regulation see e.g. J. Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World’ 54 Current Legal Problems 103 (2001). 
44
 For the legal nature of credit default swaps see e.g. M. Smith, ‘The Legal Nature of Credit Default Swaps’ 
LMCLQ 386 (2010). A credit default swap (CDS) is an insurance contract which protects an investor who owns 
bonds of a company and purchases an insurance policy to protect it from the default of these bonds. They are 
useful products to manage credit risks that banks may experience. The risk of default is assumed by an insurance 
company. If the default occurs, the buyer of the insurance policy may sell the bonds issued by the company, at 
the amount that would have been payable if there was no default, to the seller of the insurance. The CDS are 
regulated through clearinghouses which require banks to deposit their trades as well as their future contracts but 
no further regulation in the sense that prevents systemic risks are in place. It has been argued that ‘[b]anks 
bought them to reduce the amount of capital they were required to hold against investments …[i.e.] to avoid 
regulation. Because they owned the swap, banks claimed they no longer had the risk of a default of the bond.’ 
See E. Dinallo, ‘We modernised ourselves into this ice age’ Financial Times 30 March 2009. On CDSs see e.g. 
Hull, supra note 4, 497-507; E. Andrews, M. De la Merced and M. Walsh ‘Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues 
Insurer’ NY Times 16 September 2008. 
45
 S.103 Legal Certainty for Excluded Transactions. The CFMA also inserted a provision (s.118) in the CEA 
with the effect that the CEA will supersede and pre-empt any state law that prohibits or regulates ‘bucket shops’. 
The term was defined in a number of early 20
th
 century decisions most notably in Gatewood v North Carolina 
27 S. Ct. 167, 168 (1906) as follows:   
‘an establishment, nominally for the transaction of a stock exchange business, or business of a similar 
character, but really for the registration of bets or wagers, usually for small amounts, on the rise or fall 
of the prices of stocks, grain, oil, etc., there being no transfer or delivery of the stock or commodities 
nominally dealt in.’  
see also e.g. State v McGinnis 51 S.E. 50 N.C. 1905; Board of Trade of Chicago v Odell Commission Co. (C.C.) 
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is that without a meaningful regulation of innovative financial transactions, the market may 
grow unregulated to the detriment of the global economy.46 It has been argued that 
deregulation has affected the banks’ dependency on financial markets which may lead to loss 
of confidence and run on banks when market funding becomes sparse in which case those 
financial institutions that are funded mainly through deposits will be preferable. This is 
because deposits provide more predictable funding alternative and are guaranteed by 
governments as opposed to market funding from volatile and deregulated financial markets.47 
Recently proposals have been made to prohibit banks from certain types of risk taking 
activities. The most significant one is the Volcker Rule, which prohibits banks from entering 
into proprietary trading and acquiring an ownership interest in a hedge fund or private equity 
fund.48 However, there are also other views that oppose Volcker rule and suggest that 
universal banking was not the main problem but rather it was the quality of securities issued 
by the banks during the period leading to the crisis.
49
 
 
2.2 Pitfalls of Securitisation 
 
The main pitfalls of securitisation are insufficiency of transparency and disclosure, 
difficulties in determining investor suitability in appreciating the risks and the inadequacy of 
risk retention by originators. Additionally, the financial crisis has justified the fact that 
investors have over relied on the credit agencies’ ratings who applied the same criteria for 
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46
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49
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rating asset backed securities to mortgage backed securitisations. Credit rating agencies 
provided AAA rating for most products even though they were from subprime borrowers.50 
Complex nature of financial markets and transactions arguably were created ‘due to demand 
by investors for securities that meet their investment criteria and their appetite for ever higher 
yields.’51 However, the significant risk that securitisation involved was the transfer of risk 
with little due diligence from the originator to investors as a result of which there was 
reduced incentives to screen the quality of loans securitised and failure to adequately retain 
the risk in those securitised loans.52  
 
As securitisation has an extremely complex and technical structure and involves certain 
risks (such as interest rate and prepayment risks), it lacks the desired level of transparency 
according to which the quality of loans and the level of risks are determinable by investors. 
Professor Schwarcz argues that despite the disclosure of risks involved in mortgage backed 
securities, this has proved to be insufficient and the complex nature of securitisation as well 
as the length of documentation in the offering of these securities has had an impact on the 
insufficiency of information in this market.53 Ideally, the information on the products should 
be openly available to investors. Investors rely on ratings by credit rating agencies and the 
agencies are paid by originators. Insufficiency of transparency has occurred in different levels 
and dimensions of securitisation which creates a conflict of interest. These include valuation, 
pricing and concentration of risk.54 The complex nature of mortgage backed securitisation has 
led to the insufficiency of disclosure, as investors were not certain in relation to the value of 
the securities that they have invested on and exposed them to credit risk. This is also called as 
the ‘concentration of risk’ according to which lack of detailed reporting of exposures caused 
the market participants to be non-informed of the risks which then ‘led to a reluctance to 
                                                 
50
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51
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52
 See G. Caprio, Jr, A. Demirguc-Kunt, E. J. Kane, ‘The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: 
Searching for Lessons not Scapegoats’ Policy Research Working Paper 4756 (September 2008), 15 et seq. 
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 W. Dudley, “Lessons learned from the Financial Crisis” (2009) Remarks at the Eighth Annual BIS 
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engage with counterparties [and] pushed up spreads and reduced liquidity further.’55 It has 
been argued that disclosure in complex securitisation transactions cannot be a decisive 
solution as ‘complexity increases the amount of information that must be analysed in order to 
value the investment with a degree of certainty.’56 Furthermore, it was also argued that in 
those complex transactions and structuring models investors who review those documents 
might not realise the legal consequences of the transactions.57 In the absence of adequate 
transparency, investors have generally relied on the credit agencies’ ratings in their 
investment decisions.58 However, these ratings, which were generally and generously 
attributed to bonds at the highest possible value, did not consider the fact that receivables 
from subprime mortgages were incorporated to the receivables from asset securitisations, thus 
in the event of originator’s bankruptcy created a package deal in which the toxic portfolios 
could not be separated from the non-toxic ones. Additionally, the IMF report has pointed out 
that the Off-Balance-Sheet entities (such as commercial paper conduits or special investment 
vehicles) have not been transparent to regulators.59  
 
In relation to the transparency and disclosure arguments, the private law processes of 
securitisation may have a negative impact on third parties (i.e. unsecured creditors of the 
originator) by reducing the assets available to unsecured creditors. As unsecured creditors, 
unlike the secured creditors, will be subject to the pari passu principle according to which in 
the event of bankruptcy of the originator the distribution will be made on an equal footing, 
unsecured creditors’ proportion of claims will be reduced. This is because the originator will 
transfer those assets and receivables that have the ability to attract higher rates to the SPV. 
The unsecured creditor may not have the monitoring ability, unlike secured creditors, to be 
able to assess the credit risk of the originator (debtor) even though they charge a higher 
interest rate60 to compensate their monitoring costs. Thus the unsecured creditors will be left 
                                                 
55
 Dudley, id., 3. 
56
 Schwarcz, supra note 53, 99. 
57
 Schwarcz, supra note 53, 99. 
58
 See H. McVea, ‘Credit Rating Agencies, the Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Global Governance: The EU 
Strikes Back’ 59 ICLQ 701, 706 et seq. (2010). 
59
 IMF Report 2008, supra note 7, 69.  
60
 On the efficiency of secured credit and monitoring issues see e.g. T.H. Jackson and A.T. Kronman, ‘Secured 
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors’ 88 Yale L. J. 1143 (1979); A. Schwartz, ‘Security Interests and 
Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories’ 10 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1981). For unsecured creditors’ 
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with higher credit risk.61   
 
Investors’ sophistication or suitability is part of the problem. Investors expect a number of 
characteristics in securitised products. These include the strength of the origin of the 
securitised receivables (the larger the pool, the lower the risk of non-payment), the quality of 
assets and low credit risk (risk retention by the originator), the stability of the interest rates 
applicable to debtors of the underlying assets, credit enhancement by the originator where the 
originator creates distinct classes of securities with distinct risks and short maturity.62 It was 
established that, in the pre-financial crisis period, investors were not scrutinizing the products 
they were purchasing, but rather trusting the seller or the originator.63 The IMF Report in 
2009 pointed out that issuers of securities ‘relied on originator representations and warranties 
regarding the quality of the loans and the underwriting process that turned out to be 
inadequate [as occasionally] the originators lacked the capital and liquidity to make good on 
their warranties.’64 Therefore, in order to have diligent loan underwriting and monitoring it is 
necessary to have a workable policy on risk retention.  
 
3 Risk retention by originators and securitisers 
 
Following the financial crisis, suggestions have been made to reduce the risks involved in 
securitisation. The most significant is the originators’ credit risk retention requirement in the 
securitisation deal. Risk retention is ‘the meaningful exposure to the credit risk of a 
securitization’s underlying assets that cannot be removed, sold, or hedged for a specified 
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period of time.’65 Risk retention should be understood as to who should take responsibility of 
defaults and non-payment against investors. The main interest of an investor is to maximise 
its wealth and credit agencies’ rating has played significant role in the purchase decision. 
Once the originator originates and distributes the receivables, it retains little interest in the 
quality of securitised receivables. As the originator’s credit risk is effectively distributed to 
the financial markets, his incentive to monitor the quality of receivables or the 
creditworthiness of his borrowers reduces. Risk retention by the originator improves loan 
quality by having better underwriting standards, provides by diligent origination and ‘reduces 
risks to financial stability arising from incentive and informational asymmetries between the 
investor and earlier securitization chain participants.’66 This process is often known as the 
‘skin in the game’.  
 
Risk retention prevents originators to originate and distribute high risk and poor quality 
loans under the securitisation method without retaining economic risk until the relevant 
securitisation is concluded.67 The ability to raise finance in securitisation, like in factoring,68  
depends on the quality of the assets rather than the creditworthiness of the originator. Credit 
risk retention thus has more relevance at the origination. If the originator’s loan is good risk 
retention will provide an additional security for investors. The loss of investors’ confidence 
during the pre-financial crisis period has been attributed to the peculiar link between 
securitisation and incentives. There was competition among loan originators and securitisers 
in subprime lending practices and their securitisations.69 Originators transferred their credit 
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risks without appropriately screening the quality of the loans. As securitisation food chain 
became more complex70 the link between originators and investors became too weak or too 
remote which had negative impact on ‘incentives for proper screening and due diligence 
along the chain ... [which could] contribute to a lowering of lending standards and a gradual 
deterioration in the credit quality of assets included in the collateral pools of securitised 
instruments.’71 However, during that period originators lose the interest to protect the 
integrity of the overall financial market and rather protect their economic interest, creating 
misaligned incentives.  
 
The originator essentially prefers to hold the assets off the balance sheet (or isolate their 
credit risk by assigning their assets) in order to reduce its vulnerabilities that may be created 
by the difference between capital requirements and trading books. When the difference 
between capital requirements and trading books is high, that will be the sign of inadequate 
capital. Thus in order to avoid capital charges which may be imposed upon banks due to 
inadequate capital levels, banks sell these book debts (keep them off their balance sheet) in 
the form of true sale to SPVs.72 However, Turner Review observed that  
 
‘[a]t the individual bank level, the classification of these as off-balance sheet proved 
inaccurate as a reflection of the true economic risk, with liquidity provision 
commitments and reputational concerns requiring many banks to take the assets back 
on balance sheet as the crisis grew, driving a significant one-off increase in measured 
leverage.’73 
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On the other hand, investors prefer to increase their profit either through short term 
investment products (commercial paper)74 or bonds that are products of securitisation. Studies 
have established that during the period leading up to the financial crisis ‘there may have been 
insufficient ‘skin in the game’ for some lenders.’75 That is as originators distributed their 
credit risk through securitisation they did not have the incentive to monitor the quality of the 
receivables or the creditworthiness of the borrowers. Some economists76 seem to blame 
securitisation itself without looking at the human input or errors in the process,77 while others 
acknowledged the significance of securitisation and pointed out the importance of risk 
retention to reduce financial risk and that before the financial crisis in a securitisation 
transaction the originator did not have any responsibility, this reduced the incentives to screen 
the creditworthiness of borrowers thus led to irresponsible lending practices.78  
 
There are compelling reasons why originators should be strictly required to retain credit 
risk in the securitisation chain. Firstly, it is a quality control mechanism that originators will 
keep in mind that their products have the necessary quality that match the stated value 
claimed by the originators and do not contain any toxic assets.
79
 This may also serve as an 
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approval for credit enhancement where the stronger risk retention demonstrates the strength 
of the underlying assets. However, the significant problem which originators may wish to 
prevent is that as securitisation requires a true sale nature of transfer from the originator to the 
SPV, in the case of bankruptcy of the originator or where the balance sheet shows certain 
high percentage of retained securitised assets, this may be considered as charge disguised as 
sale. The main problem is that the retained amount may not be high enough to provide relief 
for investors. From another point, although banks transfer loans and risks from their balance 
sheets thus increase their capital ratios against trade books for capital adequacy purposes,
80
 
these transactions for accountancy reasons, however, may be required to be kept in the 
balance sheet to demonstrate the true nature of the transfer.81 Nevertheless, it is important to 
retain acceptable levels of risk in the products to demonstrate the strength of and confidence 
to the products sold to investors. Secondly, risk retention may lead to responsible lending in 
the sense that the originators will employ the same moral values (i.e. investment and 
expansion of business within the limits of the rule of law and ethical values) as investors do. 
In other words, if the originators retain risk in the tranches sold to investors ‘this encourages 
them to make the same lending decisions that the investors would make.’82 Arguably, this 
approach also has the potential to prevent gambling and or the so-called ‘casino banking’. 
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Thirdly, risk retention may also lead to the point where originators become the 
‘administrators of the mortgages (collecting interests, making foreclosure decisions etc.) … 
[and that] their decisions as administrators are in the best interests of investors.’83 The 
position of secured creditor and the debtor may be used as a metaphor to illustrate the 
administration argument.  The power granted to the secured creditor by the security interest 
over the collateral grants the secured creditor the ability to control the business decisions of 
the debtor. The debtor has the obligation to protect the value of the assets during the time 
when there is a security over the assets and should refrain from entering into wealth reducing 
transactions.84 Thus, retaining risk and becoming administrators of the mortgages may lead 
originators to take prudent business decisions for the best interests of investors that will 
prevent wealth reduction. Similar arguments have been made that originators in complex 
securitisation deals may be required to retain risk by retaining for example the equity tranche 
(which is the lowest ranked tranche of securities and retained in non-mortgage 
securitisations).85 In relation to the final point, although originators had retained some risk in 
the equity tranche before the financial crisis period,86 the insignificance of holding equity 
tranche compared to mezzanine and senior tranches make these earlier examples of risk 
retention somewhat symbolic. This is because equity tranches are unrated tranches which 
absorb losses when the portfolio of receivables they belong to underperforms. Thus, returns 
that may be expected from equity tranche are not guaranteed.87 Furthermore, as the 
originators used to sell or hedge the risk in equity tranches, risk retention in equity tranches 
did not provide effective alignment of incentives.
88
 For successful risk retention in equity 
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tranche it is necessary to have high quality loans (i.e. loans lent to creditworthy borrowers) 
and positive economic conditions.89 In the absence of these factors originators have less 
desire to monitor the loans provided to borrowers. Equity tranches used to be purchased by 
hedge funds and securitisers of collateral debt obligations which reduced the significance of 
risk retention by originators.90 Arguably originators may hold mezzanine tranche and in the 
event of its exhaustion, vertical risk retention method where the originator retains a certain 
percentage in each tranche, may be employed.91 The significance of vertical risk retention is 
that financial institutions do not need to have high capital requirement, as may be the case 
under horizontal retention, but hold certain levels of capital for each tranche without the 
ability to consolidate the securitisation. Whereas under horizontal retention they have to hold 
higher rate of capital and consolidate the securitisation transactions. Senior and mezzanine 
tranches provide substantive compensation to originators. This situation is explained in the 
House of Commons Financial Stability and Transparency Report as follows:  
 
...the least risky, or ‘senior’, tranche has the first claim on payments from the pooled 
mortgages. The ‘senior’ tranche has the highest credit rating, often triple–A 
investment grade, but receives a lower rate of interest than the other tranches. After 
the senior claims are paid, the middle or mezzanine tranche receives its payments. 
Mezzanine represents greater risk and usually receives below-investment grade credit 
ratings and a higher rate of return. The lowest, or equity, tranche receives payments 
only if the senior and mezzanine tranches are paid in full. The equity/first-loss tranche 
absorbs initial losses. Equity tranches are therefore the most risky tranche and 
consequently often unrated, but as a consequence offer the highest rate of return. This 
process, whereby losses are applied to more ‘junior’ tranches before they are applied 
to more ‘senior’ tranches, is known as subordination and is one, albeit important, form 
of credit enhancement.92 
 
Amendments to the current incentivisation system have been proposed by the IOSCO, the 
EU and the USA. These include retaining credit risk in the equity tranche, a vertical risk 
retention structure in all tranches or a percentage share. In the early stages of the financial 
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crisis the amendments to the current incentivisation scheme in the EU and the USA were 
criticised by being unsophisticated or too flexible that the choice of amount and form have 
been left to the originator which might not lead to best results.93    
 
3.1 Reform efforts on unregulated financial markets and products by IOSCO  
 
IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products (‘Task Force’) was set 
up in response to the reform and as part of the medium term action for enhancing sound 
regulation which required the ‘review of the scope of financial regulation, with special 
emphasis on institutions, instruments, and markets that are currently unregulated, along with 
ensuring that all systemically-important institutions are appropriately regulated.’94 The action 
plan was set by the Group of Twenty (G20) during its meeting95 in Washington, DC on 15 
November 2008. The Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform96 set out a 
comprehensive road map for the implementation of principles for reform in financial markets. 
These principles include strengthening transparency and accountability, enhancing sound 
regulation, promoting integrity in financial markets, reinforcing international cooperation, 
and reforming international financial institutions. In September 2009, the Task Force issued 
final regulatory report on transparency and oversight in unregulated markets and products 
with particular emphasis on securitisation and credit default swaps.97 The essence of 
recommendations articulated in the Final Report is, mainly, to improve investor confidence in 
the post-financial crisis period by introducing greater transparency in securitisation 
transactions and similar unregulated financial market products. The Task Force focused on 
mainly, among others, securitisation due to its significant contribution to credit availability, 
systemic risk and restoration of international capital flow as well as its role in the global 
financial crisis.98 The review for implementation of securitisation recommendations was 
published in March 2011 where it was established that most measures articulated in the 
recommendations would be implemented. These recommendations articulate the introduction 
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of greater transparency through regulatory actions to assist financial market regulators and 
financial services authorities thereby aim to improve investor confidence in post-financial 
crisis period. Recommendations include requirement of originators to retain long term 
economic exposure to the securitisation to balance the interests of originators and investors; 
enhanced transparency through disclosure by issuers; independence of service providers from 
issuers in order to ensure that service providers do not influence an investor’s decision to 
purchase securitised products; updating investors about initial and ongoing information on 
underlying asset pool performance and strengthening investor suitability. Recommendation 
1.1 states ‘originators and/or sponsors to retain a long-term economic exposure to the 
securitisation in order to … align interests in the securitisation value chain.’99 This is 
supported by three principles which establish that any retention requirement must be 
considered taking into account of the impact of the reform in domestic securitisation markets 
that this implementation needs to regard the quality of the underlying collateral backing the 
securities and that it should consider the legal processes of securitisation in the relevant 
jurisdiction. The Implementation Report pointed out that there was no clarity with regards to 
the form of risk retention (i.e. whether a fixed percentage or a risk-based approach for risky 
assets).100  
 
3.2 Reforms on risk retention in the EU 
 
The amendments in the EU to the Credit Requirements Directive (CRD)101 introduced a 
minimum 5 per cent originator risk retention requirement (article 122a) to align the interests 
of originators and investors.102 Article 122a stipulates credit institutions in the EU to act with 
due diligence in their investment decisions in securitisations only where originators have the 
acted with diligent underwriting.103 The article requires investors to conduct due diligence, 
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originators to disclose the relevant information to investors for the purposes of due diligence 
and issuers and originators to retain the credit risk. The significance of the minimum level of 
risk retention (5 per cent), which may be higher depending on the risks associated with 
underlying assets and transparency level, rather than a specific form is that misalignment of 
incentives differ in different securitisations and that the crucial point is the ability of the 
investor to appreciate the risk in that securitisation.104 The EU impact report noted that  
 
a regulatory minimum retention level appears very relevant as a regulatory backstop 
mechanism to improve market resilience in time when bubbles build up [and] such 
regulatory backstop should not be set too high. For relatively transparent 
securitisations where the information disadvantage of investors is small, the moderate 
5% minimum may actually constitute the adequate level….a higher than necessary 
retention requirement could potentially imply that certain non-bank issuers would find 
securitisations not an attractive business model anymore, meaning that they leave the 
markets and thereby reduce competition among lenders.105 
 
The amendment to the CRD highlights problems with weak underwriting standards caused 
by the originate-to-distribute model which does not allow credit risk retention. Article 122a 
requires that for exposure to the credit risk the originator must disclose explicitly to the credit 
institution that it will retain net economic interest of which cannot be less than 5 per cent. The 
amendment requires originators to disclose the level of retention and ensure that investors 
have the necessary access to the relevant data and employ the same standard to the loans 
securitised and exposures on their trading books. These amendments aim to strengthen the 
quality of origination and disclosure. The disclosure requirements of originators, in addition 
to risk retention requirements as specified above, require them to disclose the amount and 
details of the retained exposures. This will establish flexibility and investors are able to 
determine the size and form of risk retention by originators. Accordingly, a credit institution 
when investing in securitisation as a securitiser is required to get confirmation from the 
originator, sponsor or the original lender that minimum 5 per cent risk has been retained. The 
credit institution, as a securitiser, is also required to provide the relevant information, while 
investing in securitisation, to the regulators that it has thorough understanding of the risks and 
securitisation positions, thus it has complied with the due diligence requirements. If the credit 
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institution is acting as sponsor or originator, it has to apply the same credit criteria to 
exposure to be securitised as they apply to exposures to be held in their book. Along the same 
lines, the credit institution as sponsor or originator has to disclose to investors the level of its 
retention commitment to maintain a net economic interest in the securitisation, thus, will 
fulfil the disclosure requirement.  
 
The retention of net economic interest, providing different options, has been defined under 
article 122a(1) as vertical slice retention (retaining risk in each of the tranches until loans 
have been paid); securitisation of revolving exposures106 where originator’s interest of no less 
than 5 per cent retained; retention of randomly selected exposures (this corresponds to the US 
Securities Exchange Act equivalent of equivalent exposures) and horizontal retention of first 
loss (equity) tranche or other similar tranches with similar severe risk profiles.107 The latter 
two options, particularly, have been criticised on the basis that they require the retention on 
the basis of nominal value rather than risk weighted exposure.108 It is clear that equity tranche 
draws more risk weight than the mezzanine tranche and requiring a higher percentage of risk 
retention based on risk weighted exposures rather than nominal values would have been 
better.109 This would also have aligned the amendments with the Basel II requirements 
terminology which uses the term ‘risk weight’. The amendment, by having various options, 
takes into account of different types of securitisation transactions and thus effectuates the 
significance of risk retention by originators. Article 122a will affect any EU credit institution 
that has securitised products in its banking or trading books and has long arm applicability in 
that it applies to non-EU institutions selling securitisation tranches to EU credit institutions. 
An originator or a sponsor cannot hedge the retained economic interest110 but may enter into 
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risk management hedging and keep themselves exposed to credit risk. Article 122a aims  
 
to disallow hedging that eliminates a sponsor’s, originator’s or original lender’s 
exposure to the credit quality of the specific exposures that have been securitised and 
to seek to balance this objective with another, of ensuring that sponsors, originators 
and original lenders still have sufficient flexibility to risk-manage their exposure to 
broader changes in the credit quality of the asset classes, collateral, or macroeconomic 
variables to which they are exposed via their lending activities, securitisation 
activities, or otherwise.111 
 
Therefore, article 122a does not allow the originator, sponsor or original lender to 
purchase credit default swaps (insurance) to protect themselves from this credit risk when 
they retain credit risk under vertical slice risk retention, revolving exposures risk retention 
and horizontal (first loss) risk retention, and when credit risk retained under randomly 
selected exposures originator, sponsor or original lender are not allowed to hedge the credit 
risk. It is believed that this is a significantly effective method to prevent overriding of the 
effectiveness of credit risk retention arrangements. 
 
Article 122a contains certain exemptions112 according to which the retention requirement 
will not apply where the claims have been guaranteed by governments, central banks, 
institutions with a risk weight of 50 per cent, multilateral development banks (as these are 
deemed as low risk)113 and where the transactions have been based on transparent index and 
to syndicated loans, CDS and purchased receivables (as these do not constitute 
securitisation). It is arguable that the exemption of governmental or other claims should not 
have been included in the legislative text. Because in the absence of clear evidence in terms 
of the quality of rating agencies’ ratings of these claims and the recent sovereign debt crisis 
have shown that even though a claim is guaranteed by a government or other entity, it may 
still be considered as credit risk. However, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS)114 considers these exemptions not to be a circumvention of risk retention 
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requirements in the CRD.115   
 
3.3 Reforms on risk retention in the USA 
 
Similar amendments are in the process of being made to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (‘SEA’) in the USA as part of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act section 941(b) which added section 15G to the SEA. The proposed reform in 
the USA will enter into force in April 2013. A report prepared in January 2011,116 under 
section 946 of the Dodd-Frank Act, discussed a number of factors need to be considered as 
part of the reform in risk retention. The paper concluded that securitisation was an important 
source of raising finance and within the securitisation food chain it was important to retain 
risks by originators or securitisers in order to have ongoing exposure and that risk retention 
could lead to better lending decisions.117 The Report further suggested a number of objectives 
that should be incorporated into a risk retention framework which include aligning incentives 
without distorting the basic structure of securitisation, promotion of greater certainty, 
efficiency of capital allocation, flexibility in the framework and encompassing broad range of 
participants in the lending activities. As to the form of risk retention the report noted three 
options as 5 per cent vertical risk retention, 5 per cent equity tranche retention (horizontal 
first loss) and 5 per cent retention (equivalent exposures) of ‘representative sample of all the 
assets that are transferred to the issuing entity’.118  
 
The rule, provided by section 941b, in SEA 15G119 requires that minimum 5 per cent credit 
risk will be retained by the securitiser for any asset that is not a qualified residential mortgage 
that is sold through the issuance of an asset-backed security or that is a qualified residential 
mortgage that is sold through the issuance of asset-backed security if one or more of the 
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assets that collateralise the assets are not qualified residential mortgage or less than 5 per cent 
of the credit risk for an asset that is not a qualified residential mortgage that is sold through 
the issuance of an asset-backed security by the securitiser if the originator of the asset meets 
the underwriting standards stipulated in the Act. The rule exempts ‘qualified residential 
mortgages’ as the securities collateralised by these types of mortgages are less likely to 
default because these loans have been subjected to higher degree of conditions and 
verification (Section 15G(e)(4)) including documentation of borrower’s income and the ratio 
of income to debt. The securitiser will not be required to retain credit risk if all the assets that 
collateralise the securities are qualified residential mortgages. However, concerns have been 
raised in terms of the narrow definition of qualified residential mortgages as well as the 
amount that needs to be set aside by the securitizers.120 There are other exemptions where the 
Federal banking agencies (i.e.  FDIC, Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency) and the Securities Exchange Commission may jointly adopt provided the 
underwriting standards for the securitisers and originators are of high quality and that 
consumers’ and businesses’ access to credit is encouraged through appropriate risk 
management practices by the securitisers and originators. These exceptions include financial 
assets or loans made by the Farm Credit Administration and to residential, multifamily or 
health care facility mortgage loan asset guaranteed by the United States or the agencies of the 
United States except the Federal Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (i.e. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). In relation to commercial mortgages risk 
retention may include either a specified amount or percentage, or retention of the first loss 
(equity tranche). Another significant reform in section 15G is the allocation of risk between 
the originators and securitisers. The Federal Banking agencies and the Securities Exchange 
Commission shall have the authority to reduce the percentage of risk retention obligation 
required of the securitiser by the risk percentage required of the originator. In doing that the 
Securities Exchange Commission will consider the fact that whether the assets sold by the 
originator to the securitiser have low credit risk and whether there is misaligned incentives 
where the originator employed imprudent origination and whether the risk retention 
obligations have any impact on consumers’ and businesses’ access to credit in reasonable 
terms.  
 
                                                 
120
 E.g. 2 August 2011 dated letter from Representatives Spencer Bachus and Barney Frank to Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development Chairman of FDIC, Chairman of SEC, Chairman of Fed, et al.  
29 
 
Although this reform somewhat presents certainty and protection for investors by, to a 
certain extent, aligning the interests of originators, securitisers and investors, it is, arguably, a 
compromise. This is because the roots of the financial crisis can be found in the mortgage 
based securitisation where the incentives were misaligned and residential mortgages that 
were sold to subprime borrowers were securitised and mixed with asset based securities. It is 
a compromise in the sense that residential mortgages have been exempted from the risk 
retention requirements through detailed regulations that will be enacted to supplement the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The form and portion of risk retention (e.g. whether base 
risk retention, vertical or horizontal risk retention by sponsor L-shaped risk retention or 
retention by sponsor of representative sample) has not been clarified in the Act and it has 
been left to the discretion of the federal banking agencies and the Securities Exchange 
Commission. This will be achieved through regulations which will be prescribed by the 
federal banking agencies and the Securities Exchange Commission. Furthermore, retention of 
less than 5 per cent of the credit risk for an asset that is not a qualified residential mortgage if 
the originator meets the underwriting standards (section 15G(c)) seems to be vague. Because 
the underwriting standards of these assets, which could be commercial loans, auto-loans or 
commercial mortgages, could be different and the portion of risk retention might vary.  
Moreover, allocating risk between originators and securitisers has the danger of financial 
institutions purchasing assets from other originators and securitising them because they can 
share risk with those originators where their risk percentage is reduced to the extent of the 
originator’s percentage. This is more advantageous for securitisers because they do not have 
to securitise their own in-house assets (in which they are originators and securitisers and 
cannot share the risk). It has been argued that ‘[a]ggregate risk retention could be 
significantly diluted if securitizers reduce their credit risk by sharing it with originators, and 
originators evade much of their risk by hedging against it.’121 Section 15G(c)(1) do not allow 
securitisers to hedge the credit risk. Thus, it has been argued that the regulatory attempts of 
the Act are not forceful enough to respond to the issues that may arise from ever changing 
financial innovation.122  
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4 Conclusions 
 
Securitisation offers a low cost funding ability for the originator and provides improved 
liquidity. It also offers the flexibility to the originator to remove the securitised asset from the 
balance sheet so that these assets (loans and receivables owed to the originator) do not weigh 
down the balance sheet thus capital adequacy versus trade books ratio of the originator is 
improved. Securitisation diversifies credit risk for the originator and enables the originator to 
use different sources of funding whereby increasing their liquidity levels; banks are able to 
provide further loans depending on the business cycle conditions and their credit risk. 
 
The excessive usage of originate-to-distribute model in securitisation without meaningful 
credit risk retention helped increase house prices and led to the decline of underwriting 
standards. This process illustrated the distinct incentives of originators, securitisers and 
investors. Securitisation, when used properly, is a significant method of raising finance. 
However, more coherent and transparent system of securitisation and better understanding of 
its limits may help prevent further crisis based on securitisation. Reforms in the EU and USA 
provide resemblances. Both reform activities provide exemptions, although these exemptions, 
arguably, do not help align incentives. The EU reform clearly sets out the form and portion of 
retention of net economic interests, whereas the same cannot be argued for the US reform. 
Studies have revealed that ‘performance is better when the originator retains skin in the game 
as a result of affiliation with the deal sponsor or the loan servicer.”123 However, it is also clear 
that before the financial crisis originators and lenders voluntarily had kept some of the credit 
risk in their portfolios and that did not prevent the collapse of markets. It would have been 
more persuasive, had both the EU and US reforms, which require compulsory credit risk 
retention, provided variable risk retention percentages.124 
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It is clear that the IOSCO’s recommendations provide general framework for legislators 
by providing a principle that originators must retain economic interest in the securities sold to 
investors. Reforms in the EU and the USA as well as the IOSCO recommendations will, 
arguably, align the incentives of originators, securitisers and investors and implementation of 
those reforms will act as deterrent and inject confidence in the markets. It is believed that no 
concrete regulation will ever be effective against the innovativeness of financial markets. 
However, if the effective risk retention and due diligence goals are achieved, securitisation 
may continue to serve its benefits to investors.  
 
